LIFTING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN ARUBA
Only under exceptional circumstances
In terms of “piercing the corporate veil” and shareholders’ liability, the laws of the Netherlands and Aruba are nearly identical. As far as a tort matter concerns the laws of Aruba, Dutch case-law and Dutch legal literature should be considered as well.
In exceptional cases shareholders of an Aruba company can be liable for the company’s debts and obligations. Generally, two grounds for such liability are mentioned: a tort (onrechtmatige daad) committed by the shareholder and an “alter ego” situation (vereenzelviging) as regards the shareholder and his company. Under Aruba law, both can be categorized under …
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AMERICA MOVIL ABANDONS BID FOR KPN
Must KPN remain in Dutch hands?
On NU.nl I read the report that the Mexican telecom company América Móvil, owned by the billionaire Carlos Slim, is abandoning a bid for the Dutch company KPN. The report reads: “The company refers in a statement to the Mexican stock exchange authorities to the barrier that the Stichting Preferente Aandelen B KPN [Foundation for KPN B Preference Shares] has thrown up and to the discussions it has held with the Dutch company. These have shown according to América Móvil that it would be impossible to obtain more than 50 percent of the KPN …
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AMERICA MOVIL ZIET AF VAN BOD OP KPN
Moet KPN in Nederlandse handen blijven?
Op NU.nl las ik het bericht dat het Mexicaanse telecombedrijf América Móvil, het concern van de miljardair Carlos Slim, afziet van een bod op het Nederlandse bedrijf KPN. In het bericht staat: “Het bedrijf wijst in een melding aan de Mexicaanse beursautoriteiten op de beschermingswal die de Stichting Preferente Aandelen B KPN heeft opgeworpen en op de gesprekken die met het Nederlandse bedrijf zijn gevoerd. Daaruit is volgens América Móvil gebleken dat het onmogelijk zal zijn om meer dan 50 procent van de stemmen bij KPN in handen te krijgen. Daardoor heeft het volgens …
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THE ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION OF A CURAÇAO COMPANY (III)
Controlling minority?
Such a situation (i.e. example 2) is possibly less desirable from the company’s perspective, certainly where the more essential decision-making is concerned. Although decisions should be taken on the basis of a discussion of content and it will not always be possible to predict how the meeting of shareholders will vote, the possibility of ‘accidental’ majorities (whereby a minority shareholder nevertheless has the majority through the absence of others at the meeting of shareholders) leads to less predictability, or at least to greater uncertainty.
If a company has, for example, one 30% shareholder and the remaining 70 shareholders …
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THE ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION OF A CURAÇAO COMPANY (II)
Articles determine the nature of the company
A company’s articles of association determine the nature of the company (take for example the description of the purpose), regulate the internal competences (e.g. dismissal and appointment), limit the powers (e.g. decisions requiring approval), determine the internal responsibilities (e.g. drawing up the annual report and accounts), regulate the external powers (who represents the company in law), determine the method of decision-making, etc. As indicated above: the articles of association are somewhat comparable with the constitution or the state regulations of a country. The articles of association are therefore essential to the proper functioning …
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THE ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION OF A CURAÇAO COMPANY (I)
Comparable with a constitution
The articles of association of a Curaçao company (a public [NV] or private [BV] limited liability company) are somewhat comparable with a constitution or state regulations: the articles of association comprise – like the law, but also additionally to the law and, where permitted, unlike the law – the rules of play (rights, obligations and powers) to which all the organs of the company (managing board, supervisory board, shareholders’ meeting) and the members of those organs must adhere or on which they can rely.
The law of Curaçao does not prescribe that a special (or qualified) …
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VALIDLY REPRESENTING A CURACAO COMPANY
Extract and Articles are of importance
Limited liability companies like the Curaçao NV or BV are legal entities. Whether or not a managing director has the authority to validly represent a company can be derived from the extract from the Trade Register of the Chamber of Commerce of Curaçao together with the articles of association of the company.
However, it could be the case that the company has further regulations from which representation limitations follow. This should be assessed on a case by case basis.
A counterparty may rely on a written statement from the board of managing directors or …
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INSOLVENCY AND LIABILITY
Not (or late) filing for bankruptcy
In Curaçao, there is no statutory obligation for managing directors of a company to file for the bankruptcy of the corporation. Therefore, managing directors are not responsible to the creditors for damages sustained by them as a result of any ‘late’ filing for bankruptcy. There is no such obligation for shareholders of a corporation either.
However, creditors of the corporation may hold a director liable on the basis of tort if he entered into a transaction on behalf of the corporation while he knew, or should reasonably have known, that the corporation would not …
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IMPACT OF THE LIABILITY TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE DIRECTOR (II)
2nd degree director as director of a foreign corporate director
It appears from the 2011 ruling referred to by the Supreme Court that Section 2:11 of the Dutch Civil Code is applicable to the joint and several liability of a director of a Dutch legal entity being a director of another Dutch legal entity. The Supreme Court confirmed this doctrine again in clear wording in its decision of 21 June 2013.
The conclusion is as follows:
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IMPACT OF THE LIABILITY TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE DIRECTOR (I)
Liability of the 2nd degree director
Under Section 2:17 subsection 1 of the Curaçao Civil Code, the liability of a legal entity as a director of another legal entity (the direct or 1st degree director) also rests jointly and severally on each person who at the time this liability arose for the legal entity was its director (the indirect or 2nd degree director). It applies to this indirect director as it applies to the direct director that he will not be liable if he can prove that he cannot be blamed for the improper performance of duties, also considering his …
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DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY IN CURACAO
Quasi-director may be held liable too
The members of the board of managing directors are personally and severally liable towards the limited liability company (NV or BV) for any loss caused by the improper performance of duties. Each member of the board who proves that he cannot be blamed for such improper performance and that the activities concerned fall outside the scope of activities addressed to him, and that he has not been negligent in taking steps to avert the related consequences, is not liable (Section 2:14 subsection 4 Curaçao Civil Code; “CCC”). Therefore, a division of tasks among such …
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A CURACAO COMPANY WITH NEGATIVE EQUITY AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT
Restrictions for providing financial support to a party acquiring shares in its capital?
A company cannot purchase its own shares if it has a negative equity capital or when this equity capital becomes negative by purchasing them, whereby the nominal capital applies as the lower limit (Section 2:114 subsection 2 of the Curaçao Civil Code in conjunction with Section 2:118 subsections 5 to 7 of the Curaçao Civil Code).
The question is, however, whether a Curaçao NV (public limited company) or BV (private limited liability company) with negative equity is allowed to provide financial support to a third party acquiring …
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